Australia and the Export Land Model

I normally try to be a “Good News” kind of guy, but today I bring bad tidings. Despite my previous claims that Australia is The Place To Be, we are in for some tough times here.

TOD has featured the Export Land Model (ELM) on several occasions (http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3018 ). A summary can also be found in Wikipedia.

The concept is deceptively simple:
Oil producing countries service internal markets first, and then export their surplus. Observations of oil exporting countries show that their internal markets continue to grow rapidly even after the peak. So their exports are hit by 2 factors - declining production and increasing domestic consumption. As a result, their export capacity drops with unexpected rapidity.


An Example: Precipitous Decline In Net Exports From Indonesia.
Source: Matt Mushalik, based on data from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm

The consequence is that the effects of Peak Oil hit importing countries disproportionately, and the effects occur very rapidly once the exporting trade partner(s) have peaked.

The “Big Player” importing nations have responded to an increasingly constrained energy future by attempting to “lock in” access to energy resources. They are employing a number of strategies:
- entering into long-term supply contracts (e.g. China’s long-term deals with Woodside for Australian LNG, and the China/Russia Long-Term oil deal http://gr.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/xw2003/xw200305/t145719.htm )
- buying a controlling interest in resource companies (e.g. China recently made an unsuccessful bid for UNOCAL in the US, but looks like having more success with its rumoured bid for Oil Search here in Australia)
- securing resources through treaties (e.g. the US’s NAFTA treaty with Canada, which commits Canada to supplying the US with oil )
- military adventure (dare I mention the US again here?).

The response of the oil exporters is more veiled, but it appears that countries like Russia are moving towards a Resource Nationalism policy, husbanding their energy resources and making less available for export.

Thus we have a three-fold problem:
1. Decreasing exports from producing countries due to declining production and increasing domestic consumption
2. Decreasing exports due to an evolving Resource Nationalism policy
3. Increased “lock-in” of available exports by the Big Player importers

The analysis of the export problems so far has largely focussed on the US and has concentrated on mitigating the problem by locking in supply (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Ed9jsKAOHU ). The analysts and strategists appear to be focussing on the fact that the big players can lock in supply and thus partially mitigate this problem, but the question "Where does this leave the small players?" has largely slipped under the radar.

Here in Australia, it is time to ask that question. What will be the impact of decreasing oil exports on Australian markets?

There has been a flurry of recent warnings about a “supply crunch” starting in around 2010-2015. These warnings have come not just from advocate groups, but from the International Energy Agency (http://omrpublic.iea.org/mtomr.htm), and from several of the oil companies, with the most recent and most forceful warning coming from the Shell CEO (http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell-en/our_strategy/shell_globa... ).

The consensus seems to be that there will be a serious supply crunch within 5 years, so we should look at how we will be positioned in 5 years.

Australia.

Australia currently produces a bit over 50% of the oil we consume. Our production peaked in 2000, and is now in decline, with occasional jumps as new production is added. We currently produce a bit over 500,000 bd and this figure is dropping:



Australian Oil Production (Click to Enlarge)
Source: EIA, http://www.eia.doe.gov

Our consumption has rapidly approached double our production. Consumption appears to have stabilised short of 1,000,000 barrels per day.

As we continue to grow in the years to come, our oil consumption is likely to continue to grow. However in that same period our oil fields will continue to deplete. Thus, inside of 5 years we will be able to supply significantly less than 50% of our demand. Based on the graphs above, it will probably be less than 40%.

What happens to Australia 5 from now years when we are competing for the very small amount of exported oil that is not already locked in? To answer that, we need to look at where our oil comes from.


Countries Exporting Oil to Australia.
Source: Matt Mushalik, based on data from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm

We source our oil from a number of countries, with the most important being Vietnam, PNG, UAE, and Malaysia. Our dependence on these nations is steadily increasing. Although we are bringing more capacity online, this capacity has not kept pace with our decline rate, driving the increasing dependence.


Australia’s increasing dependence on imported oil.
Source: Matt Mushalik, based on data from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm

However the countries that we source oil from are experiencing declining exports.


Declining Exports From Countries Exporting Oil to Australia.
Source: Matt Mushalik, based on data from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm

So our oil comes from countries that are suffering from an increasing inability to supply oil. We are not the only nation that these countries supply oil to. As their capacity to export oil declines, we are not likely to be a priority customer.

So which of our suppliers will be in a position to continue supply in 5 years?

A Look At Australia’s Top Four Suppliers.

Vietnam, which is by far our biggest supplier, provides an interesting case history. Vietnam’s oil production peaked in 2004.


Vietnamese Oil Production.
Source: EIA data, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=VM

The decline in production since 2004 appears to be significant. When we look at exports, however, the decline is not just significant, it is precipitous.


Decline in Vietnamese exports.
Source: EIA data, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=VM

Vietnam’s production peak occurred in 2004, but their exports peaked earlier, in 2000. This is explained when we look at their ferocious increases in domestic consumption:


Vietnamese Domestic Consumption.
Source: EIA data, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=VM

The charts above certainly suggest that it won’t take long for Vietnam to hit exports that are effectively nil, perhaps as little as 2 years. However the graph does not tell the full story - Vietnam has a number of projects coming on line over the next few years.

It is hard to estimate flow rates in the 5 year range based on projects that have not even been completed yet. Most recent oil projects have generally been dogged by delays, disputes and disappointments. These have been caused by the fact that modern projects are going after increasingly challenging fields, and the difficulties are exacerbated by shortages of both resources and qualified staff.

However, given the number and size of upcoming projects, it is probably reasonable to assume that while Vietnam may continue to see a drop in exports, it will not drop to zero in the near term. My prediction is that Vietnam will drop below 50 kbd within 5 years but the rate of decline will slow.

This prediction is based on nothing more than looking at the upcoming projects documented in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Megaprojects, then weighing the projected peak flows (which are likely to take a few years to achieve) and the difficulty of the projects, against the recent historic evidence for delivery delays and cancellations. If there are industry insiders who can give me a better prediction for Vietnam’s export capacity in 5 years, I would love to hear it.

Based on this prediction, it is highly unlikely that Vietnam’s exports to Australia will keep pace with Australia’s rising demand.

Our next largest supplier is Papua New Guinea. As with Vietnam, PNG’s oil production chart also suggests that production has peaked and is now in decline:


Papua New Guinea Oil Production.
Source: EIA data, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=PP

Not surprisingly, PNG’s net exports also show a significant drop:


Papua New Guinea Oil Exports.
Source: EIA data, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=PP

On the basis of this graph, it appears that PNG, is rapidly approaching nil exports. PNG’s domestic consumption patterns do not suggest much hope of a recovery for exports:


Papua New Guinea Domestic Consumption.
Source: EIA data, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=PP

With consumption increasing at this rate, an improvement in PNG’s declining exports is unlikely. There is nothing at the Megaprojects site (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Megaprojects ) to suggest that a major turnaround is likely. On the surface, it appears that PNG will only be a significant net exporter for a few more years. Once again, I would love to hear from anyone who can enlarge on, or contradict this view.

Australia’s third largest supplier is the UAE. Here at last we have some good news, with no sign of a net export decline:


UAE Oil Exports.
Source: EIA data, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=TC

So the UAE is showing modest increases in exports. It is probably reasonable to hope that the 12% of Australian imports supplied by the UAE may still be supplied in 5 years.

Australia’s fourth largest source of oil is Malaysia. Malaysia’s graph shows signs of a plateau and decline, with the production decline commencing in 2005. Colin Campbell (in material released by the ASPO and quoted at http://www.theoildrum.com/story/2006/10/5/215316/408) estimates that Malaysia will decline at 6%.


Malaysia Oil Production.
Source: EIA data, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=MY

Malaysia’s exports show the expected decline:


Malaysia Oil Export Pattern Matches The Pattern of Plateau and Decline.
Source: EIA data, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=MY

Malaysia’s graph suggests a drop to nil exports within around 5+ years, however this may be attenuated by Malaysia’s domestic consumption, which shows signs of stabilising:


Malaysia Domestic Oil Consumption
Source: EIA data, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=MY

The megaprojects site (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Megaprojects ) suggests that more production might be coming online in the next few years. Malaysia may be able to prolong the decline in exports for some time if they can hold production decline to 6% or less and limit their growth in consumption.

Summary.

So of Australia’s top 4 suppliers, 3 show declines in exports. I will not bore the reader with further charts; I will simply comment that as you work through the list, you do not find that it gets any better.

More worrying is the fact that Australia is not the only country competing for this diminishing supply. The exporting countries do not just export to us, they export to many countries. As their exports diminish over the next few years, they will be forced to choose. Will they choose to export to the economic and military powerhouse countries, or will they decide to “be nice” and ship their oil to Australia? I would not expect to find many analysts who would bet on “nice”.

Questions:

Q. Do producers really drop to zero net exports? Surely as they approach zero they find ways to keep exporting?
A. Britain dropped to zero net exports, Australia dropped to zero net exports, Indonesia, US, etc, etc. It is possible that once the price of oil goes high enough a trickle of oil will continue to flow, but the price will need to go very high and the trickle is likely to be very small.

Q. What will happen to small developed nations that do not produce any oil?
A. They will compete with us to buy the small amount of remaining oil. They will probably be willing to go very high indeed to secure the oil they need.

Q. Are we doomed?
A. No. But we are in for a tough time.

Conclusion.

It is likely that Australia faces some tough choices. This crisis has slipped “under the radar” because the ELM is a relatively new model and we are only now coming to grips with the consequences.

In 5 years our oil demand is likely to increase by a modest amount – perhaps as little as 5-10% - but the ability of our suppliers to export to us is likely to be substantially diminished. The degree to which the exports will be diminished will depend on the success and flow rates of new projects. My estimate, based on current trends and future projects planned by our suppliers, is that a cut in exports by 35-45% is not beyond the realms of reason.

So we are likely to have less oil, and we are going to pay much more for it. We can expect locally produced oil to meet 30-40% of our needs in 5 years. If we accept that we are limited to our “share” of the diminished exports then we can expect to face a shortfall of around 20-30%.

If it is closer to 20%, then we face an extremely difficult time. However, if it is 30% we face an economic catastrophe. Which is it?

Unfortunately, the “error bars” on this estimate are significant, and even 20-30% is more precise than I can justify. For the shortfall to drop below 20%, the upcoming projects would have to be delivered on time, would have to reach their estimated peak capacity, and would have to achieve this capacity quickly. Given the recent history of such projects, this is not the way to bet. A bet that the shortfall could go higher than 30% of imports, while unlikely, is not completely ridiculous.

Australia uses oil for the transport of:
- Food
- Goods
- People
- Resources

A significant reduction in the oil-based transport of people in Australia could probably be carried out if we are willing to accept the impact on our economy associated with the loss in tourist dollars (a move to expand electrified public transport would mitigate this impact, but not in the timeframe that I am looking at). However our capacity to transport food, resources and goods is critical to our personal and economic well-being. The immediate impacts of a 30% reduction in oil supply are not pleasant to contemplate. The longer term and knock-on effects can scarcely be imagined, but are likely to be wide-ranging.

We could not accept that scenario. However our alternative is to pay potentially prohibitive prices for the small amount of oil that has not been locked in. Unfortunately, every other nation in our situation is likely to reach the same conclusion, so competition is likely to be fierce.

Where will this oil come from? Mitigating against the concerns outlined above is the fact that some countries still have an increasing production capacity. As this oil comes on line there is likely to be fierce competition for it, but Australia's economy is relatively strong - we should be better placed than many other nations to bid for some of this oil.

There seems little doubt that we will be forced to pay a very high price in order to “bridge the gap” while we commence building a sustainable energy infrastructure. However, we are lucky enough to be well placed to pay the price and bridge that gap.

The thing that I find surprising (and even a little frightening) about this scenario is that it is not in the distant future. It is only necessary to project out 5 years to see a significant probability of shortfalls.

In my next article I would like to explore the options open to us as a nation.


Acknowledgements

Obviously the whole article is based on the Export Land Model. This model was based on work by Jeffrey Brown, who credits a number of other contributors.

I would like to thank Matt Mushalik, many of whose graphics were used in this article. I use his graphics with permission.

As always, Big Gav and Phil Hart have been generous with assistance and feedback.

This will likely be dealt with in the next article, but anyone have a handle on the size of Australia's LBG supplies, depletion rates and how much is locked in to long-term contracts?

IOW, how much will Australia be able to substitute it for petrol?

If you mean LNG, then I'll be posting something on Australian Gas real soon now (which might still be a couple of weeks away, at my current slow rate of progress).

LNG it is! I'll look forward to that, Gav

Dominoes and International Commerce. Otherwise known as "Connecting the Dots".

Do shortages in Australia affect the rest of the world, and how fast does it fall apart? You bet it does buckos! So the ELM kicks in and causes Auzzie Land to undergo large industrial cutbacks, so what? Well, there is a large and significant Aluminum production facility in Canada (initials RT) that depends on the Alumina coming from Gove, Au for the feedstock. N. American energy use is accelerating towards electricity use to displace fossil fuel use. Greater electricity use means more aluminum conductors for transmission and distribution circuits, and the dots start to connect. Trouble in Auzzie Land means big trouble in Gross Consumption Land (GCL) and the dots get connected while the dominoes continue to drop.

S. Africa remains as a microcosm of what/will happen on a global scale in the world of interdependent industries and processes. We are not independent nor isolated. Bad weather in the southern hemisphere means tomato prices rise this week, Brazil joins OPEC because it desires protection from American hegemony, the Athabasca River has no more water to offer so the Alberta Tar Sands will not offset Saudi oil supply, and hush, hush, hush and we all fall down.

Natural gas prices in western N. America will soon compete with world prices because LNG is happening. Really! Shipping natural gas around the globe has to be the clearest sign of mass insanity. Both shipping inefficiency and application inefficiency dictates we are either i) no smarter than yeast, or ii) not socially evolved past the Chimpanzees.

In closing, I hope posting this on the Aussie site will prevent the black suburbans filled with men wearing dark glasses from showing up at my door. No, really, its coming to this... the battle for gas and oil has gone domestic.

/vsyxx

We are likely to give everything a go. In a report on ABC TV last week, Linc Energy are trying to produce liquids fom coal seam methane. The alrming thing is that they were going to ignite the coal in situ, pump in air to keep the fire going which in turn provides a heat source to drive coal gas and steam out through a well. The resulting liquid was touted as clear "diesel" which could be further refined.

If this works, one has to wonder how long our export coal industry will last.

This declining net export theme was first written about by John Hallock in a 2002 paper (with Hall and Cleveland) reviewed here on Energy Bulletin.

Heres a link to the full paper, "Forecasting the availability and diversity of global conventional oil supply" (pdf warning 1.4mb)

Matt Simmons, who inspired my work, started talking about rapidly rising consumption in exporting countries in the same time frame.

Very good work. I continue to be amazed that net oil export capacity is not the #1 story worldwide.

Regarding the end game for net oil exporters, I have slightly modified our terminology, from saying that they will hit zero net exports, to saying that they will "approach" zero net exports; however, the real damage to the world economy comes not from the final 10% decline in net exports, but from the initial 90% decline.

The ELM is a simple mathematical model that shows net exports going to zero in 9 years, from the final peak, with consumption equal to 50% of production at peak. Note that only about 10% of post-peak production from Export Land would be exported.

The thing that continues to amaze me is how similar the UK and Indonesia net export declines were, given vastly different per capita incomes and energy taxes/subsidies, with the UK going to zero in 7 years, Indonesia in 8 years. The common factor was that consumption was about 50% of production at the final peak.

It seems to me that virtually every net oil exporting country in the world would fall somewhere between Indonesia and the UK in terms of per capita income and energy taxes/subsidies.

Regarding the UAE, it was the only top five net exporter to show an increase in net exports in 2006 (EIA, Total Liquids), but our (Khebab/Brown) logistic based middle and low cases are not very optimistic, and the high case is only slightly less pessimistic (the projected middle case 10 year net export decline rate is -4%/year):

http://graphoilogy.blogspot.com/2008/01/quantitative-assessment-of-futur...

Aeldric, you have discovered that ELM is already 'alive and well' - as you have found, it's already in the data, you just have to search it out, no longer just a theory.

I would just add that you have a chart there called 'Australia's Oil Consumption and Imports', this shows the 'import land' problem very well.

Once an importing country that has some production of it's own peaks, it's increased demand % for imports suddenly becomes = (total consumption growth + the decline rate of local production) and sadly this is often a massive increased demand, as in the case of Australia.

However, spare a thought post 'world peak of net exports' for those countries where ~100% of consumption is imported - that is every country in the Europen Union except two!!!.

At the moment 'world net exports' are down ~3% from a peak in late 2005, this has allowed the 40 or so 'net exporting' countries to continue to grow their consumption while world all liquids production has been flat!

Looking on the bright side, at least you will easily meet the UN required 30% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020 from oil!

Maybe now you can see why there has been so much emphasis on climate change emissions - working towards a planned defined goal (IMO too late and unreachable) rather than a catastrophic economic brick wall.

Hi WestTexas,

How did you calculate the growth and decline rates? For instance, the Saudi rate you quote is not the 2005 to 2006 rate. Is it the average growth (or decline) over some number of years going back? Thanks.

Saudi Arabia’s initial 10 year projected production decline rate is -2.7%/year ±2% per year. The projected rate of increase in consumption is +4.4%/year ±2% per year. Their initial 10 year projected net export decline rate is -4.7%/year ±4%. Our middle case shows Saudi Arabia approaching zero net exports in 2031, within a range from 2024 to 2037.

We used the predicted range of consumption and production numbers for 2015 to give us the low case, middle case and high case projected net export decline rate from 2005 to 2015.

Once production in a given exporting country starts falling, the actual net export decline rate tends to accelerate with time, which is what we are almost certainly going to see for Saudi Arabia in 2007 versus 2006.

Sorry, I meant how did you get the +4.4% consumption number for Saudi Arabia? Is that the average of the last 2 years demand? Or three years? Or some other procedure? I don't doubt the results, I would just like to be able to explain how it was calculated if someone was to say, why shouldn't it be 2.2%.

Khebab used a Monte Carlo simulation method, based on recent consumption, to estimate a range of future consumption, which resulted in very low projections for Russia.

I thought the ELM was accepted here?

Isn't this a big load of duh?

Actually, Stuart, at least in the past, has generally dismissed the concept.

And in a larger sense, until fairly recently, even in Peak Oil circles, almost no one (with the exception of some people noted above) was paying any attention to net oil exports.

As Dr. Bartlett noted, we have trouble with the exponential function. This is perhaps doubly true with the net export phenomenon--where the combination of an exponential decline in production and a generally exponential increase in consumption results in vicious net export decline rates. While whether Saudi Arabia has peaked continues to be a hot topic of discussion, the amount of oil that they actually delivered to the market in 2007 probably declined at around 10%, versus about a 5% drop in 2006.

We need confirmation for the theories that everybody accepts too, not only for the controversial ones.

Otherwise, we wouldn't know if we were really right, and could miss some important insights.

Isn't this a big load of duh?

Depends on your understanding of "duh"...

I thought the piece on 4 billion cars was intended as humor.

"Duh", I said when I read it, "A big load..."

If we agree on validity of the Export Land Model, shouldn’t we be working to understand effects of the Import Land Model?

Import Land Model- A model of the effects of the decline in oil available for consumption to discretionary sectors of an importing nation’s economy as a result of the Export Land Model and simultaneous domestic consumption increases by non-discretionary sectors of the economy. This combination of declining imports and increasing domestic consumption by a significant fraction of the domestic economy leads oil available for all other sectors of the economy to decline at a far faster percentage rate than oil availability itself is falling to the importing nation.

Assume that an oil importing country – Import Land – produces 10 mbpd, consumes 20 mbpd and imports 10 mbpd. In Import Land, 25% of all oil is consumed by the government (18%), energy production (6%), and agricultural (1%) sectors of the economy, or 5 mbpd total (WAG, Reference needed).

Over a five year period, imports drop by 50% to 5 mbpd due to the effects of the Export Land Model. Meanwhile internal production drops by 20% to 8 mbpd. This leaves Import Land with 13 mbpd to consume, a drop of 33% over 5 years (9%yoy).

The government of Import Land will be under severe societal stress to keep energy, food, and governmental services working. If they somehow maintain these sectors without increasing internal consumption, it will still leave only 8 mbpd for the discretionary economy, a decline from 15 mpbd over 5 years (13%yoy).

This example conservatively assumes no growth and low estimates in non-discretionary spending, low Export Land and Import Land oil production decline rates, and starts with a nation that only imports half of its oil. All are likely (or certainly) optimistic for many Import Lands.

Clearly the economic impact on the discretionary economy will be far more severe than is suggested by the Export Land Model.

I called it "Rationland" a while back.

Basically you can rank usages in decreasing order of priority, each of which ratchets up the compound decline rate for what's left. Each carves out what it thinks it needs and leave what's left for those further down the pile.

Net effect is that in a well-ordered economy certain sectors hurt VERY fast. Third world first, suburban poor second, discretionary third, and so on. The resilience of that economy to change and loss eventually defines how fast it collapses. As it collapses it drags down other usage, giving others further down the path the time to adapt - it they chose to take it.

Our future gets defined by how soon people realise what's happening.

First stage is already happening, second is not far off.

Our world is a fragile egg, balanced on a knife edge that keeps on tilting. The route down is not as secure or pleasant as the route up.

Yep thats about right.

Also export land itself is a multistep process that mimics ration land.

First the oil exporters ensure the local market is well supplied. Next that are the first tier importers for finished products if they don't have enough refining capacity. Next on the list are countries with refining capacity in excess of internal demand. Next are countries that import both crude and finished products. Next in the chain are countries that import only finished products. And last are poor countries that subsist on imports of diesel and gasoline and worse depend on diesel electric generators. And at the very end are poor countries that are wholly dependent on imports and have subsidies.

We focus a lot on crude oil itself but the real impacts right now are going to be in finished product flows given the above chain. Its like North Dakota in the US the guy at the end of the pipeline gets screwed first.

I think that finished product exports will experience tightening first simply because more local markets have to have demand met before exports are sent on.

So if I'm right we will see a spike in gasoline prices this summer widening above oil prices as we have to pay more for gasoline imports. So the poor who drive long distances in low MPG cars could get hit hard as early as this summer.

we will see a spike in gasoline prices this summer widening above oil prices as we have to pay more for gasoline imports.

Memmel, crack spread can only increase with high utilization rates, otherwise partially idle refineries will bid up crude prices. We’re seeing it today with the high prices and tight spread. Tight supply means tight spread.

This time its not from the crack spread but lack of imported gasoline.

It looks like the crack spread is increasing but the gasoline importers have to cover increased costs for gasoline and oil we be expensive. Or refinery utilization might actually be down while the "crack spread" is high.

Lest say you can produce gasoline from imported crude at 2.50 a gallon but your imported gasoline or blending components is coming to 3.50 a gallon. You have a dollar spread between imports and gasoline you make but if you don't import you don't have enough gasoline. Logically you have to either back down on internal production or probably back off on imports until the price increase to cover your import costs. Your correct that calling it crack spread is not quite right but its easier then saying imports are substantially more expensive than domestic production. We actually saw refinery utilization back down a bit last year while imports where robust. I'm not saying that you will get a dollar spread but imported gasoline will get expensive so no matter how you cut it your going to have to get prices up to cover your total costs.

Also it makes sense that if imported gasoline is expensive crude is also expensive from the base export land model.

The actual crack spread for locally produced gasoline might be quite low under these conditions and we actually saw that last year except last year I don't think imported gasoline and blending components where a issue I think they where actually cheaper then running our new heavy/sour refineries at capacity.

At a million barrels a day of gasoline imports its enough to influence the overall price.

What I'm saying is we simply won't have enough imported gasoline to meet demand without a significant increase in price even with our refineries running at maximum and a low crack spread. This means something has to break.
Crack spreads have to start bouncing back to bring in more imported gasoline.

But notice its a bit of a catch 22 if we ramp up refinery utilization then elsewhere probably in a nation we import gasoline from they won't have enough oil to support export to us.

The intrinsic problem is we have to import significant amounts of gasoline and blending components. Once the worlds oil supply is low enough then we will see shortages and expensive gasoline imports. This will result in strange moves in the crack spread. Some places will back down on exports as its not cost effective thus idling plants and resulting in a low local crack spread. Until gasoline supplies get dire then we will import like mad and crack spreads may widen but the cost of oil will go up as well so :)

The key component is that imported gasoline and blending components will become expensive and scarce this cost will have to be passed on to the consumer. Its not clear if the real crack spread will widen or not.
What will happen is gasoline prices vs oil prices will start to widen as long as we need imported gasoline.

Garyp, Could you embellish your theory a bit? Are you suggesting a bidding war, a governmental rationing system, or something else?

Simple really. The reaction of most governments to declining fuel supply will be to implement a form of rationing system. The UK has it all defined and written down, and I'll bet most others do too. Even the US is likely to implement something along these lines.

  • 'Essential' users come first: Ambulance, Police, Fire Engines, Politicians cars, etc.
  • Then come the secondary elements: the cars of workers, tanker drivers, food transporters etc.
  • Then come tertiary users: farmers, chemical processing, etc.
  • Finally comes everyone else.

That rationing can be on simple availability, but might extend to price controls on the first items as well. Farmers already get red diesel with lower tax, but in future they might discounts on costs with the difference being made up from higher charges on group 4. All to ensure things are kept in check.

Now, if you total up the first three and cast the net wide enough to try to keep all key parts of civilisation working, together with the secondary feeders to those, you can end up with a sizeable percentage of the supply earmarked by the government to these purposes. From the point of view of the general motorist, trying to commute to work, the available supply falls even faster than exportland suggests, together with costs rising faster as well. If physical decline rate is 4.5%, exportland might make that 10% and rationland 18%. Each acts a multiplier.

Now rationing sounds like a sensible reaction to declining supplies. However the multiplier it puts into the decline rate of the fuel available to individuals means their opportunity to adapt is reduced. If, say, exportland forecasts max>zero transition in 10 years, rationland might cut it to 6 years. Its not just a matter of SUV > economical small car, its any vehicle to no vehicle, no commuting, within a few years.

Somewhere in the continuum of decline rates, there is a break point. Literally patience breaks, people react, society breaks down. Personally I think that's fairly early on (I agree with the MI5 maxim) but wherever it is, rationing can actually mean we hit it faster and with more certainty.

That's not to say that the alternative of farmers not being able to afford fuel is attractive either, just pointing out that rationing is no magic bullet and can actually make things worse.

And combine that with the multitiered ELM where some countries have to import gas too and then we ahve some very quick declines for certain parts of populations in certain countries. Essebntially you could make a complicated computer simulation isolating hwo falls first out of supply chain globally depending on supposed rationing scheme and structure of oil and refingin idustry /production in that particular country.

Call it mulititered ELM/Rationland collapse computer simulation.

Call it Multiiterated ELM/Rationland Decline Evaluator
(for the french)
;-)

Exactly and thanks for fleshing this out. I've been banging on WT for a while now that the ELM is a mutli-tiered effect. The key is it gives you good indicators to look for.

1.) Poor countries that import 100% diesel gasoline go first. Already happening.
2.) Price of gasoline/diesel for export rises dramatically vs crude.

What is the global market if any for this ?

3.) Crude prices rise as countries with excess refining capacity import more to make diesel/gasoline for export.

4.) Refining costs for "local" usage increases. For countries that are dual refiners/importers they have to deal with the cost differential between locally produced gasoline from crude and imported gasoline.

5.) Real spare refining capacity exists in the global system.

5.) Crack spreads become volatile but overall for countries that import finished products the cost of gasoline/diesel vs oil is increasing even as the price of crude is increasing.

6.) Hoarding probably becomes commonplace and OPEC uses high stock levels where measured to justify lowering production.

7.) Supply contracts start breaking down and suppliers renegotiate because of higher prices sending more people to the spot markets for crude and finished products causing firm lower price bounds below speculative increases.
The important thing is trust is replaced with fear leading to more imbalances in the market.

7.) Systematic shortages start developing around the globe. A movable famine instead of a movable feast. This is a result of attempts to hedge in a volatile market failing. A lot more people will attempt to actually take delivery of real oil in the markets but the oil simply won't be available.
At any point in time at least one part of the world will be facing shortages.
In general the poorest will suffer more often than not but with the system glitching shortages are possible anywhere.

Volatility is rampant. And whats important is crude storage is probably not a good indicator of the overall condition of the market. For the US for example you should look at the crude storage level of the US and all the nations it imports gasoline from. For finished products its the combination of locally produced products plus import levels.

By the time crude inventory becomes a issue in the wealthiest nations the system will probably be close to break down so its a lagging indicator.

2.) Price of gasoline/diesel for export rises dramatically vs crude.

What is the global market if any for this ?

The EIA has spot prices for gasoline in several markets, including Rotterdam (NL) and Singapore.

Monthly price in Rotterdam in January was $2.23/gal; times 42 gallons/barrel, that's $93.66/bbl, or just $1.50/bbl over the
January price of Brent. The price in Singapore was $2.39/gal, or $100.38/bbl, or about $2.50/bbl above the price of Tapis.

So it's pretty clear that the world price of gasoline hasn't risen dramatically vs. crude. I don't know why you'd expect it to rise at the same time as the world had spare refining capacity, though; that does seem contradictory.

Read my ramblings I don't think this has happened yet but a multi-tiered ELM with each market ensuring adequate local supply before exporting implies that the first place divergence will happen will be in exported finished products.

At this point spare refining capacity is irrelevant to some extent since its crude supply problem. Your not getting enough crude to satisfy both your local market and export markets. In effect this is what ELM is saying at each stage your take care of the politically sensitive markets first before moving on to the free market. The key to ELM in my opinion is that local markets are not open.

The example is if crude supply is tight France or Korea will make sure that the home market is well supplied before they ship exports to the US. This will force the US into paying a premium for its finished gasoline and blending components.

I suspect that if this starts to happen the president will waive clean air rules which will offer a temporary reprieve by opening up the US market to more refineries.

So that would probably be a signal to watch.

Question for you is that spot prices in Rotterdam for the US markets ?

Or do you look at New York Harbor and LA ?
I think you have to read off the prices for NY and LA and if I'm right its a
13 cent spread vs Rotterdam. And look at LA.

However the historic data seems to show about the same spread back in time with a quick eyeball.

Thanks for the link I'll check from time to time. But I think we will see two leading indicators first we stop filling the SPR then we relax the clean air rules before we really need to take a hard look at the gasoline import situation.

Isn't this a big load of duh?

Aeldric posted this on TOD:ANZ and it was Australia specific. Most of the discussion on TOD relates to how PO will affect the US or Europe or Chindia and very little thought ever given to how it will affect smaller countries or regions.

I thought it was a great post and and in no way deserved your "Duh?" comment. As an Australian it certainly shook my tree.

It is a very telling illustration for a particularly large island, apologies to Poms, which makes it easier to do. It might 'wake' people up, or allow those so inclined or capable to make predictions and take action.

Global renewable Energy, for Australia:

link

I think this post brings to light the interplay of several oil availability factors in an important way. Sure, ELM is a 'duh' to anyone who looks at it even cursorily. But the layers of effects as discussed herein by Xeroid, garyp, memmel and others helped take my understanding of ELM's consequences to a deeper level. So thanks to all. Here's my contribution. Essentially, the dynamic of increasing consumption and declining extraction works on both ends. That is, it works to decrease net exports from Export Land more rapidly than would gross declines in extraction or increases in internal consumption on their own, and it works to increase Import Land's net desired imports more rapidly than would either dynamic on its own. Some countries were doubtless never net exporters, but we're all well familiar with the fact that the US was once the supplier to the world. The US, in effect, is simply deep into the effects of its own experience with declining net exports. So the end result is that as the gaping jaws of net desired imports (NDI) open wider, the jaws of export land are snapping shut. Imagine yourself a baby bird, but the wider you open your mouth to be fed by your parent, the tighter they close theirs and refuse your need. The knock-on effects as discussed herein will overlap and multiply each other as will the effects of climate change, species extinction, population growth and a host of others work to exacerbate each other as deftly illustrated by the documen