The Limits To Scenario Planning

I was involved in one of those periodic discussions that spring up about "The Limits To Growth" recently (one of my recurring bugbears) and found myself wondering, not for the first time, if other people have read a completely different version of the book to the one I possess.

In this case, the remark that prompted this was an assertion that the book only mentions energy once - when it actually mentions energy at least 40 times. However, most misconceptions about "Limits" fall into one of 2 categories:

1. Doomers and cornucopians alike claim the book makes a prediction that industrial civilisation will collapse, as we overwhelm our resource base and the environment (the doomers view this as a correct prediction, the cornucopians as a prediction that has been proved wrong - see this article at The Economist for a classic example).

2. Conspiracy theorists claim the book advocates world government and forced population reduction in order to avoid the collapse that it predicts.

Both of these views are completely false, yet I have never come across a rational discussion of what the book actually describes - which is a number of scenarios involving population, economic growth and resource consumption that have been generated using a computer model (known as World3) operating under various sets of assumptions and looking at a timeframe spanning the next 100 years.

The book doesn't actually "predict" anything. The authors explicitly note that it is not a forecast, and that they do not believe the available data and theories would enable an accurate prediction of what will happen to the world over the next century. The scenarios are simply a range of different examples of how the world might evolve.

Given this, I wondered why so many people have misunderstood what the book actually says...

[The graphs below display part of the output for scenario 9 in "Limits" - the forgotten scenario that I am complaining about.]

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The Scenarios

Each scenario in "Limits" describes a number of factors - state of the world (population, food, pollution, available resources and industrial output), material standard of living (life expectancy, food/person, services/person, consumer goods/person) and human welfare and footprint (human welfare index, human ecological footprint).

In the most recent edition of the book, the "30 Year Update", there are 9 scenarios described, plus an additional show what might have happened if the recommendations in earlier editions of the book had been put into practice 20 years ago.

Most scenarios do end in various levels of overshoot or collapse - it certainly isn't an optimistic tome.

* Scenario 1 shows the model's output assuming "business as usual" continues, with all indicators heading down by 2050, and population back at 1970's levels by 2100.

* Scenario 2 looks at a variant of BAU that assumes a much higher availability of nonrenewable resources (imagine if we could ramp up tar sand / heavy oil / shale oil extraction to keep oil production growing for another 40 years), which it calls the "global pollution crisis" scenario. Again, it ends badly.

* Scenario 3 combines the large nonrenewable resources assumption with widely deployed pollution control technology - this delays the peaking of the indicators, but still ends in disaster, starting around 2070.

* Scenario 4 extends scenario 3 with the assumption that agricultural yields can be further improved using technology - again, things start to fall apart around 2070.

* Scenario 5 adds better control of land erosion to the previous scenario - this delays the onset of problems by another 10 years or so (all of these scenarios basically run into trouble once the extraction of non renewable resources has peaked and gone into decline).

* Scenario 6 considers the outcome of making much more efficient use of resources on top of the assumptions listed previously. This scenario looks much better - the overall human welfare index and population both increase for a while and then level out. By the end of the modeled period industrial output, goods/person and food/person are in decline as a result of what they call a "cost crisis" (apparently because increasing efficiency can't indefinitely sustain production based on a depleting base of non renewables). No overshoot or collapse has occurred at the end of the 100 year period.

* Scenario 7 is based on the same assumptions as scenario 2, but with universal birth control availability resulting in an average 2 children per couple. Like scenario 2, it ends in a "pollution crisis".

* Scenario 8 extends scenario 7 with a political limit on industrial production that restricts output per capita around current levels. Again, this starts to fail around 2050.

* Lastly, scenario 9 (the one everyone seems to forget) assumes pollution control technology, increasing efficiency of resource utilisation, increased agricultural yields, stable population (growth easing down to replacement rate) and stable industrial output per capita. This scenario (shown above) ends with all indicators stable and above present levels at the end of the century.

Obviously there are a lot of other variations that could have been modeled - the set above isn't exhaustive.

Following the scenarios is a section entitled "Transitions to a sustainable system", which recommends a wide range of practices to be implemented in order to make scenario 9 the one which eventuates (which presumably is the one most people would choose if given the option). The recommendations include:

* improved monitoring of our impact on the environment and the resource base
* improved response times to signals from the monitoring described above
* extending planning horizons
* increased use of renewable resource (such as clean energy sources)
* aiming for maximum efficiency in use of resources
* closed loop industrial techniques (commonly known as "cradle to cradle" manufacturing)
* regenerative agricultural practices
* poverty reduction
* nonviolent conflict resolution
* accurate/unbiased media
* “decentralisation of economic power, political influence and scientific expertise”
* “stable populations” and “low birth rates” by “individual choice”

Influence and Critiques

"Limits" is one of a number of books that have influenced the study of issues such as peak oil and global warming. Matt Simmons produced a 2 part "Energy White Paper" back in 2000 called "Revisiting The Limits to Growth: Could The Club of Rome Have Been Correct, After All?" (part 2). "The internet's ultimate malthusian" (or peak oil's ultimate kook, depending on your point of view), Jay Hanson, also appears to have been heavily influenced by it.

"Limits" has also been the subject of a number of critiques of varying degrees of quality - some of the most prominent being "Thinking About The Future" (also known as "Models Of Doom") by a group of authors (and including a reply by the "Limits" authors) and Herman Kahn's "The Next 200 Years", which I reviewed a while back in "The Fat Man, The Population Bomb And The Green Revolution" (and which I'm soon to write a follow up to).

Scenario Planning

"Limits" is an exercise in scenario planning (you can find a great set of resources on the topic from Martin Börjesson here), a practice popularised in the business world by Shell.

Shell's latest exercise in scenario planning ("Blueprints or The Scramble") was the subject of a lot of attention in peak oil cricles recently. Shell also has a set of resources for learning about scenario planning. Another prominent group in this area is the Global Business Network (GBN) which includes a number of Shell alumni.

One ex-GBN scenario planner who is prominent in the Viridian world and has written frequently about energy and the environment is Jamais Cascio, who co-founded WorldChanging and now runs a site called "Open The Future".

Jamais writes about both the art of scenario planning and actual scenarios considering a diverse range of issues - some posts that are worth checking out are one on "Open Source Scenario Planning", which I think is particularly relevant for group blogs like TOD with a large readership, and "Green Tomorrows: The Scenarios", which considers a set of scenarios involving responses to global warming. These scenarios are also largely applicable to peak oil (as global warming solutions are often solutions to peak oil as well - though the converse frequently isn't the case).

Limits

Given that Jamais has a lot of experience modelling scenarios and presenting the results to decision makers, I thought I'd ask him if the problem we encounter with people misunderstanding "Limits" is a common one - do people only remember the scenarios that fit their preconceptions (and thus seem the most plausible, to them), particularly when the modellers don't assign probabilities to the scenarios ?

Jamais responds:

[This happens] all too often. It is a recurring problem when scenarios move from the hands of the people who worked on them (and thus have an emotional investment in all of a set) to people who are supposed to act on them. The classic example is when the strategy group offers scenarios to the executives, who proceed to focus on a single one and ignore or dismiss the others.

Today, many scenario strategists, rather than simply present the set of scenario options, walk the recipients through a set of experiences around the set of scenarios, in order to provoke a visceral response.

This, in my experience, has been one of the most useful recent developments in the scenario practice -- it works. That's what the fictional narratives try to provide for written scenarios, although they obviously don't work as well as in-person encounters.

So how do you achieve this effect when you publish your scenarios in book form then ?

Then it's time to get creative: add a game of the scenarios to the book, or give instructions as to how to build a walk-through, that sort of thing...

(Crossposted from Peak Energy)

In your longer article, and at the original on TOD we have the phrase "Powering Civilisation To 2050".

Of course this begs the question... whose definition of "civilisation".

And it is this unspoken assumed definition that is then examined/promoted/defended.

I got the impression from Stuart Stanifords article that that assumption was of a western technologically driven "growth" economy.

We should remind ourselves that "civilisation" is "just" the sum total of the collective behaviors and institutions in a culture during a particular defined period of time. Use of the term as if there is 'The' or 'A' civilisation that is the goal in many discussions about the future is annoying and, I think, blinkered.

For example, in Stuart Stanifords article, why does he use the term "requirements" instead of "assumptions"?

Interesting point.

I won't presume to speak for Stuart, so I can't answer the last question.

Personally I don't view "civilisation", when I've referred to it, as meaning anything more than a technology based society that has industries involved in the mass production of goods and services.

Whether or not this is worth retaining is a separate (but interesting) question.

By and large I'm not against current day civilisation, I just think it needs to be transformed so that it operates in a truly sustainable way. That isn't a utopia of course - just a way for a large number of people to get by without enduring the overshoot / collapse outcome.

Lastly, scenario 9 (the one everyone seems to forget) assumes pollution control technology, increasing efficiency of resource utilisation, increased agricultural yields, stable population (growth easing down to replacement rate) and stable industrial output per capita. This scenario (shown above) ends with all indicators stable and above present levels at the end of the century.

The problem I see with scenario 9 (admittedly using my perhaps limited faculties), is that it appears to indicate that by 2000 we had used less than 1/4 of our endowment of resources, indeed just over 1/8 from the look of it. Does this really square with what we are seeing with respect to resource depletion, ie copper, lead, aluminium, rare earth elements, not to mention fossil fuels? Perhaps we really do have 7/8ths of our resource endowment left, but that proportion is certainly not the high grade sources we began this adventure with.

As we move to increasingly lower grade ores we need to move more material to extract the same amount of end resource, so even with a hypothetical 100% efficient earthmoving machine we still need to expend proportionally more energy to get what we need as the ore quality declines. Even moving to electric machinery and renewable sources will require ever expanding infrastructure to supply a constant amount of a resource, meaning the use of the other resources required to make that infrastructure will rise continuously, won't it?

Essentially, what is saved in increased efficiency manufacturing aluminium window frames is lost creating more machinery & energy sources to power them to mine more rarefied aluminium ores?

The problem I see with scenario 9 (admittedly using my perhaps limited faculties), is that it appears to indicate that by 2000 we had used less than 1/4 of our endowment of resources, indeed just over 1/8 from the look of it. Does this really square with what we are seeing with respect to resource depletion, ie copper, lead, aluminium, rare earth elements, not to mention fossil fuels? Perhaps we really do have 7/8ths of our resource endowment left, but that proportion is certainly not the high grade sources we began this adventure with.

The "peak minerals" question is an interesting one, and a topic that I think is far from settled.

Herman Kahn was particularly dismissive of this idea (see my "Fat Man" article for my commentary on this), and by and large I tended to agree with him.

I think with many minerals, we haven't come close to peaking. Recycling and substitution rarely seem to get factored in when depletion of minerals is considered either.

Using your aluminium window frame example, do we really need to use aluminium for window frames - isn't wood sufficient in most cases (ie. my house has no aluminium window frames at all). In addition, aluminium is incredibly common in the earth's crust - are we really even 1/8 of the way to depleting it ? Is it noticeably more difficult to extract aluminium now than it was 20 years ago ?

The most clear cut example of resource depletion seems to be oil. Some rare metals (indium for example) and phosphorus are worth keeping an eye on. Other metals like gold, copper, iron ore etc I tend to think aren't going to be a problem for a long time yet.

The other factor to consider is once population levels stabilise, and all countries reach a certain level of industrialisation, I'd expect to see the need to extract new metals from the earth to slowly wither away.

This is the cradle to cradle idea - all industrial inputs are simply recycled from previous production - you don't keep extracting more stuff out of the ground.

When you look at the future using that as an assumption, scenario 9 actually seems overly pessimistic.

I'm not saying this is the most probably outcome however - just that I think this is the best one to aim for...

"When you look at the future using that as an assumption, scenario 9 actually seems overly pessimistic."

Wow! We obviously view the world very differently. When I read LTG I found myself finding all sorts of assumptions that bias towards a fine outcome. The authors point this out themselves, explaining how in their models there are no bad actors...corrupt politicians, greedy corporations, mob-violence, religious extremism, special-interest lobbying, paranoid nation-states...etc.

Scenario 9 seems so astonishingly impossible given the real world I did basically dismiss it.

Hmmm - I didn't say that this was probable - just that if you assumed that our industrial systems were converted to operate as a closed loop system, you could come up with a more optimistic scenario.

Its not impossible for this to be done, but its certainly a huge task, even larger than converting to a completely clean energy system.

It would be a nice thing to attempt though.

You're right - it would be nice to attempt. And I think you are right in thinking that there are a lot of resources that we have barely tapped. There are two very important factors that must be considered during that attempt, however.

1) What is the realistic possibility of making an attempt that is not heavy influenced by "bad actors"?

2) Although many resource bases may still be very abundant, the real questions are - which ones are not, and how will they affect our attempts at creating a sustainable culture?

As long as these things are also kept in mind, I am all for working for a sustainable society.

I am all for working for sustainability, but for sustainability you must begin where it is at least possible to be sustainable. At 6.6 billion people with the concomitant environmental destruction, we are ... how far away from a population sustainable on the remaining ecology?

4.5 billion too far? 5.5? 6.5?

"If there were one species that could disappear for the benefit of the sustainability of the planet, it would be us." -- Jane Goodall, "The Selfish Green" BBC debate

Yep. As always, population is one of the primary problems. I think our cultural/belief biases regarding growth and our rights to reproduce are so strong that it will take non-voluntary reductions to shake us (as a society) out of our complacency.

"I am all for working for a sustainable society". But you won't.......until everyone else does...... and everyone else thinks the same as you.
When will we start sustaining? When should we have started? Will we ever?

Look at the world around you. Over consumption is normal now, it is what got us to where we are and it will inevitably lead to collapse. We absolutely need overconsumption to sustain economic growth.

We used to have one TV per household, now there is three or four, several DVD recorders, cell phones etc. We must have the latest technological gadget or appliance.
YOU will start a sustainable lifestyle when it does not affect your means or when you are forced by circumstances. You (and I) are like the vast majority, the human race as a whole is easy to understand and predict.

Look at the past to see the future. The depletion of a resource including foodstuff will encourage a frenzy, an orgy of destruction and scramble, to get it before it is all gone or before someone else does. That is human behaviour. We will watch as the last tree is cut down, carrier pigeon slaughtered or coal seam plundered.

Sustainability will be a reality forced upon us. It won't even be recognized as what it is.

Until then we will sacrifice anything and everything to maintain a perception of business as usual.

Won't I? Perhaps on a global level my contribution means virtually nothing until most other people work towards sustainability and we reduce our population, but on a personal level there are plenty of people who are voluntarily reducing their consumption, or trying to produce for themselves. And I am one. I fully understand how futile that is when 99.9% of other people are not, but you have to start somewhere. Things won't change overnight. And I, like many people who are voluntarily changing, have a long way to go.

You may well be right - sustainability may end up being force upon us. That doesn't preclude trying to work towards a voluntary change.

I'm sorry if I insulted I'm sure you mean well..
The level of sustainability which was/is/will be required, means sacrifice. Buying a smaller car and putting a solar panel on the roof won't cut it. That's not sustainability, that's self preservation.
Eating less, growing and slaughtering your own. Sustainable manufacturing and construction.
Your perception of "entertainment" must alter completely and forever.

Our obsessive quest to obtain or participate with what makes us feel good is the ultimate journey to destruction for human kind.
Every species likes to be pleased. Animals would eat themselves to death if they could. The problem with us, is we have the ability to seek and bask is pleasures which become addictive and then appear normal. Like any addict we must continually increase our pleasure levels to obtain the "high" we sought.

Human pleasure centres can be stimulated by drugs, violence, sex, power, status, gambling and eating.
In the developed world and now in the developing world, since the turn of the last century and especially since the 1950's each succeeding generation expects more pleasures from life, they also expect more for their offspring.

We absolutely, positively cannot change. Our very existence now is interwoven with the type of world we have created. Everything is interdependent on over consumption which we have grown used to. It's acceptable behaviour.

All the popular solutions to peak oil involve more consumption. It's an attempt to maintain the current way of life. Synthetic oil, wind mills, solar cells and so are illusory solutions, exploited by governments and business. They too need straws to clutch, they have a way of life to maintain.

No insult taken. Although I may quibble over some of the specifics of your argument, I agree with you in general.

First of all, you're talking primarily about the western world, not the whole world. Over consumption is a larger problem, particularly in the U.S., than in other parts of the world such as Japan, which has anemic economic growth for many years now, greatly because of lack of "western style" consumption.

Furthermore, you're going way too far if you think people need to grow their own food and slaughter their own animals. Many members of society have not been growing their own food for thousands of years now. Things may have to change, but we're not going back to the point where people all grow their own food.

As far as us being unable to change, you're underestimating people's adaptability when forced to change. People wouldn't buy 3 TVs if each TV cost $10,000. Maybe people wouldn't be happy about it, but they'd survive.

You name every single technological innovation as illusory. I say your ideal of living on the farm where we all slaughter our own animals is even more so. Even faced with problems, we're still going to endeavor to move forward, not backwards. I doubt an agrarian society could support anywhere near the population we currently have, so that scenario already assumes catastrophic failure and thus is hardly something to aim for.

Sustainability will be a reality forced upon us. It won't even be recognized as what it is.

As a colleague of mine is fond of saying (somewhat ominously), "by 2100, we'll all be living sustainably".

Yeah, why not give it a try.

I like the following attitude:

"Can we rely on it that a ‘turning around’ will be accomplished by enough people quickly enough to save the modern world? This question is often asked, but whatever answer is given to it will mislead. The answer “yes” would lead to complacency; the answer “no” to despair. It is desirable to leave these perplexities behind us and get down to work.” E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful

Nice one - that sums it up pretty well.

Personally, I like:

It's far too late and things are far too bad for pessimism.

-Andre'

(the quote apparently is variously ascribed to Barbara Marx Hubbard or Dee Hock)

Nice quote.

Given this, I wondered why so many people have misunderstood what the book actually says....
Given that Jamais has a lot of experience modelling scenarios and presenting the results to decision makers, I thought I'd ask him if the problem we encounter with people misunderstanding "Limits" is a common one - do people only remember the scenarios that fit their preconceptions...

Most of this thread goes off discussing whether or not the scenarios are optimistic, pessimistic or whatever. But I'm much more interested in the why do we misunderstand part. Is there some sort of selection for groupthink - Obama, Hillary and Change, for example? Is there some sort of biochemical mechanism by which we affect each other's thinking? Is this Dawkin's evolution by meme? I can't see why we would select for mistakes, except maybe it's better to be in the herd than the single surviving lone wolf [Was the single man left on Mars in Bradbury's Martian Chronicle really any better off than everyone else who returned to earth for the final wars?]

The same thing was happening to the announcers during the Super Bowl. Before the Patriots scored in the last half, the announcers were talking themselves into turning on their golden boy Pats. And the Giants? Forget it - even though the Giants weren't playing the same game as the Patriots and there were still two minutes left. These are experience sportscasters - they should know better than I. But herd mentality or groupthink seems to trump any sort of critical thinking.

We go out of our way to misunderstand. We put effort into missing the point. Why? How does that help our genes? Does it function by increasing conflict? [Obviously I'm way past my depth here.]

cfm in Gray, ME

I'm much more interested in the why do we misunderstand part. Is there some sort of selection for groupthink? ... herd mentality or groupthink seems to trump any sort of critical thinking.

Drywki,

Interesting observation.

There may be a tie here to Nat Hagen's discussion regarding our dopamine based addictions to oil.

In that other post, Nate talks about pecking orders among social animals and how the establishment of a pecking order reduces repetition of infighting and thus minimizes energy expenditure (energy wastage) by the group as a whole.

Well, the phenomenon of "groupthink" achieves the same end result: minimization of energy consumption by the group through the unquestioning adaptation of a cohesive way of thinking, no matter how wrong the thinking is.

By conforming, and "going along to get along", individuals within the group minimize their own energy expenditures (because thinking consumes energy). They in essence become energy parasites who profit off the energy expended by others in the group, the ones who already did the "hard hard" thinking (as one esteemed leader of the USA is fond of saying).

Additionally, the group as a whole reduces its energy consumption by not spending more than a minimal amount of time thinking about, critiquing or reviewing a particular point of view or decision.

So take the decision by the American people to go to war with Iraq as an example. Once an initial "go" (rather than "no go") decision was adopted, the bulk of the herd fell into line and made the excuse that further questioning was "unpatriotic".

But truth be told, most people do not enjoy doing some hard hard thinking on their own. It consumes personal energy and personal time. It's so much easier to become a mental parasite and unquestionably adopt the "groupthink" as one's own.

Thank you for bringing up this very interesting question. :-)

And thank YOU for your development of it.

... Sometimes I just fall in love with this site all over again!

I'll ditto that sentiment.

This site is filled with many perspicacious contributors like Driki who spend time (and their own energy) thinking about stuff and posing interesting questions. Then collectively we start developing greater understandings of the world around us.

If it hadn't been for Nate Hagen's excellent post the other day, I would have never started thinking about energy conservation within a group. If it hadn't been for Driki's observant question, I would have never made the connection between the two ideas. So it is only with the combined contributions of all the people here at TOD that ideas are developed.

Thank you Jaymax for pointing that out about why TOD is so cool. Most web sites are filled with flame wars. This one is filled with thoughtful discussions. Let's keep it up.

Additionally, the group as a whole reduces its energy consumption by not spending more than a minimal amount of time thinking about, critiquing or reviewing a particular point of view or decision.

Someone else made the point that any major decisions made by leaders that are supported by the people (groupthink) by definition rely on the support of 'irrational' people in order to succeed. In this case, these 'irrational' people could be seen as those who "...do not enjoy doing some hard thinking on their own."

I thought the connection with 'irrational' people was a good insight in spite of (or possibly because of) the fact that it grates on a lot of people who like to think of the human race as having the capability of making 'rational' decisions in a groupthink-like way. The challenge for a really good leader is to take advantage of the group-think (sheeple?) tendencies of people without coming across as an evil manipulator (Cheney?). Good leaders and bad leaders use the same basic 'rabble-rousing' techniques. It's just that good leaders happen to espouse policies that I agree with ;-) (after having thought long and hard about them of course!)

'Irrational' people could be seen as those who "...do not enjoy doing some hard thinking on their own."

Actually we are all guilty of not liking to do all the hard hard thinking on our own.

We are all idea-parasites.

How often have you heard someone say, "I'm not a ___ expert, but those who are say that X is true and Y is false"?

(Fill in the blank and substitute as appropriate for X and Y.
Example: ___=Petroleum, X=Infinite_growth, Y=Peak Oil.)

We all accept the "hard thinking" done by the experts and blindly adopt most of them as our own. If the doctor says, "Take this blue pill twice a day," you do it. If the banker says, "Take this subprime loan," you do it. If the government says, "We're here to help ...", you believe them.

A complex and highly specialized civilization requires that we trust others to do the hard thinking for us. We each can't do it all.

Just on the "Peak Minerals"... I was reminded of "Peak Wood"
The essay linked to from that EB article is still available as a series of unfinished book chapters which makes a very interesting read.

Chapters 3 Fire and Metals: Copper, 4 The Bronze Age and 5 Iron had some interesting ideas about the interplay between metal purity, yields and sources of fuel coupled with the development of ancient empires.

The author also mentions why there are no magic bronze swords, only magic iron/steel swords.

Isn't it a fact that we generally extract the most economical ores of a mineral first? This is why we use bauxite rather than kaolin clay for our feedstock when making aluminium. I've read an abstract of a paper that states that unless we get out there and find more bauxite we've got about 25 years left of "easy pickings". (http://www.springerlink.com/content/gl8v1738l98l122l/)

When we move to substitution we increase pressure on the substituted resource above and beyond what has already been factored into usage growth rate predictions, therefore bringing peak in that resource closer, as well as increasing the energy required and taking the hit of reduced efficiency, assuming we are generally using the most efficient material for the job in the first place (and market forces would generally dictate we are)

For example consider the current use of copper as a conductor, and the move to aluminium as the substitute suggested by some people in order to cope with the predicted increase in the use of electric cars and the need for all that extra wiring. Copper is a better conductor per unit volume, aluminium per unit weight. But the main problem is that aluminium requires a lot more energy to refine into a useable end product, so we then need more power sources to supply the extra demand to make that substitution. This, coming at a time when we want to create a heap more alternative power sources to replace existing demand, so we are hit with twice the crisis, needing more power stations, more wiring for those stations, and more wiring for more cars.

In those chapters I linked to this was one of the issues raised.
The example cited was the Island of Cyprus which was once THE preeminent copper exporter because of an unusually rich deposit but even so...

The tremendous tonnage of ancient copper slag on Cyprus suggests that the Cypriot copper industry collapsed around 300 AD simply because the island ran out of cheap fuel. The slag heaps suggest a total production of perhaps 200,000 tonnes of copper, and that in turn suggests that fuel equivalent to 200 million pine trees were cut to supply the copper industry, forests 16 times the total area of the island. Even given that high-altitude Cypriot forests can regenerate quickly in the right conditions, this suggests that wood fuel was a critical constraining factor on the Cypriot copper industry, and must have been a persistent problem on the island for other industries too.

The landscape of Cyprus today (and Greece, and Turkey, and Lebanon, and in fact most of the Mediterranean seaboard) is quite unlike its appearance 5000 years ago. The magnificent cedar forests of Lebanon were felled largely for timber for buildings and ships, but copper smelting must take most of the blame in Cyprus.

SO when you substitute a lower grade ore where does the energy come from to extract it?

Hence large grains of salt (and some healthy skepticism) are needed when someone just quotes the massive tonnages of minerals available from the earths crust without reference to the concentration (and therefore energy requirements) of the ore bodies - a key reporting requirement of any prospective mining company at float time, No?

Now some clever physical chemistry can overcome some of these limitations... but overcoming entropy is a Red Queens game.

Another interesting quote about ancient fuel use, this time around Athens, and the silver mine that powered its golden age.

The great silver mines of Laurion, near Athens, required not only the fuel to smelt the ores, but the fuel to build and maintain the water cisterns. Wertime estimated on the basis of 3500 tonnes of silver and 1.4 million tonnes of lead production for classical Athens over perhaps 300 years, that the Laurion mines had consumed 1 million tonnes of charcoal and 2.5 million acres of forest. It is, in fact, quite likely that the mines declined, not because they were exhausted of ore, not because the miners had reached the water table, but because the fuel costs had risen to the point that they were uneconomic to run. It is clear that deforestation, accompanied by soil erosion, was already a severe problem in Attica, the region surrounding Athens. Plato wrote that the region is

a mere relic of the original country.... What remains is like the skeleton of a body emaciated by disease. All the rich soil has melted away, leaving a country of skin and bone. Originally the mountains of Attica were heavily forested. Fine trees produced timber suitable for roofing the largest buildings: the roofs hewn from this timber are still in existence.

I like both your quotes, and I understand the point, but in order for this to be more than an abstract argument you'll need to provide some actual examples of minerals that have ore quality that is in noticeable decline so we can consider how soon a crunch point arrives and what alternatives are available, in terms of either recycling the existing (extracted) quantity of the material or finding substitutes.

Other constraining factors can also be introduced (water, energy etc) - but in the case of energy I've long held that we could get more energy from renewable sources than we currently do from non-renewables, so I don't really feel that the assumption that energy *must be* a limiting factor is a valid one.

Isn't it a fact that we generally extract the most economical ores of a mineral first?

As a general rule, perhaps we could assume that is true - but that doesn't imply we are close to getting through the most economical ores yet.

Regarding specific minerals, I'd like to see an accurate estimate of global reserves with mineral grades plotted against against the reserves estimates (preferably showing past extraction as well). Minerals reserves estimates (in my experience anyway) don't have anything like this sort of data available. The paper you reference for bauxite looks interesting but I can't get to the detail. I'm somewhat wary of existing reserve estimates for common materials, as exploration tends to be limited when there is copious supply readily available.

In Australia, the problem has usually been finding capital and markets to develop huge mineral deposits, not finding suitable quality ore. The largest mines have lifespans that may stretch for a century - and some of these are only just being developed.

I might add that the original assumption isn't a given - it hasn't been true for oil for example - most of Iraq's high quality, cheap to extract oil remains underground, while far more expensive North Sea oil has already gone into decline. Politics (or the intersection of economics with national interests) can be as important in how and when resources are extracted as pure economics.

assuming we are generally using the most efficient material for the job in the first place (and market forces would generally dictate we are)

Are you sure this is true ? Is aluminium the cheapest form of window frame ? Or just one that meets the requirements at an acceptable cost given current energy and mineral prices ? Would it really be impossible to substitute wood, for example, for aluminium without running out of wood ?

The wiring question is interesting - but I'd like to see a copper depletion graph that shows that we can't build out an large scale smart grid and electric transport fleet before I assume that this can't be done...

It certainly would be nice to have the kind of data needed readily available, but it generally doesn't appear to be. Just briefly, the following article covers peak copper:

http://www.321energy.com/editorials/watson/watson121605.html

Worldwide economic reserves of copper are stated to be 470 million tonnes by the USGS 2005 summary for copper. If the 2004 mine production figure of 14.5 million tonnes is held steady into the future, copper would be exhausted within 33 years.

But as he mentions, there are other reserves that are not currently exploited for various reasons (Antarctica for one) though I have no idea whether these are included in the above figures.

Geoscience Australia indicates that investment in copper exploration (in AU) increased by 68% in 2006 to $177.5 million (http://www.ga.gov.au/minerals/exploration/resources_advice/AIMR2007.jsp) We supposedly have a resource of 42.4Mt of economic demostrated resources of copper, up just 2% after a 68% increase on exploration expenditure. The report at that address also indicates that average copper prices were up 86% in 2006, whilst we had a 5% decrease in production and an 8% decrease in exports (I'm looking forward to reading the rest of the report on other resources, should be informative...)

From the following news article on China gives a rough reference to recent production (http://www.sinofile.net/saiweng/sip_blog.nsf/d6plinks/YZHI-7465PE) June 2007:

This year, copper production worldwide will increase 4.3% to 18m tons, but demand will increase 4.7% to 17.8m tons.

So production has already increased by 4 million tonnes, so on the 2005 figures we have less than 33 years left, given that reserves seem to be growing more slowly than production and demand (though I cannot find any authoritative recent worldwide figures in a brief search)

Watson goes on to say:

However, if you believe that reserves are purely a function of price, you may take comfort in the recent USGS suggestion that the total reserve base of copper (economic and uneconomic) is not the 940 million tonnes of its 2005 summary but a whopping 1.6 billion tonnes! Sadly, some reading between the lines of that statement reveals a more sobering truth that half of that estimated tonnage does not appear to have been discovered yet!

Emphasis is mine. So we may be okay? Or is it more like growth in oil reserves?

In the following, discussing Ok Tedi: http://www.rettet-die-elbe.de/oktedi/cu_strategy.htm there is a brief mention on the change in character of ore reserves:

One tendency, that makes forecasts variable, is what is regarded "exploitable". Around 1900 ores contained 5% Cu, 1980 a minimum of 0.5% Cu appeared profitable (at Ok Tedi the mean content is 0.8%). By improvement of flotation techniques even lower contents will be accepted. However, the mere amount of dead rock, flotation water, and tailings will become the problem.

Which is dated in the early 1990's, but illustrates that we have moved the exploitable grades from 5% to 0.5%. There is no indication as to whether there are still reserves at 5% that we can exploit. I don't know how it really works, but would costs for the 0.8% case allow the producer to set a price that allowed competition with a similar producer operating on 5% grades, or would the market as a whole have to be down to the 0.8% case to make all of them equally viable?

I totally appreciate that politics/national interests have a large part to play, but don't they usually make the situation worse than a base quantitative case?

As for window frames, I'm not saying it would be impossible to substitute wood, but that the impacts of that substitution flow on through the entire economy and have unexpected consequences in other areas. Consider the following: if we have to ramp up timber plantations to replace the current project home usage of aluminium for windows across the country, this extra land needs to be taken from some other land uses. It obviously wont be the prime agricultural land we are currently burying under suburbia, so it must come from "real" farmland. This then puts pressure on food and fuel-crop prices, and so around we go again.

The wiring question is interesting - but I'd like to see a copper depletion graph that shows that we can't build out an large scale smart grid and electric transport fleet before I assume that this can't be done...

Me too :-) Have you seen anything on rough guesses as to how much wiring would be needed to build the grid and the fleet anywhere? I recall that on roeoz one of the fellows did up a rough estimate of the cabling needed to create a certain sized solar farm, and it was a fair amount. Might see if I can find it later on.

OF course the huge attraction of our aluminium window frames is lack of maintenance.
Wood needs to be periodically painted.
Of course, think of all the window frame painting jobs that would be created.

Thanks for following through with that.

I agree that this is an issue that needs to be kept in mind and studied carefully (sooner rather than later) - I'm just loath to jump to a definitive conclusion in the absence of conclusive data.

Ok Tedi is an interesting example to use - one reason for the relatively low grade of copper may be that it was also a gold mine - and thus this may not be a true indicator of the economics of a pure copper mine at this point in time (Olympic Dam would be another, where gold and uranium are also products as well as copper). It would be interesting to see the grades for BHP's big newish mines in Chile.

I'll note once again (sounding like a broken record) that with a stable population, a fully industrialised planet and cradle to cradle style manufacturing, demand for raw materials would drop dramatically compared to the current era of growing population and China and India industrialising - so the modelling for this has a lot of factors to take into account - scenario 9 still seems possible if all the right actions are performed...

The reserves of low grade copper ore can best be described as Germany. It's called the Kupfershale and includes parts of Poland as well. Of course, it's a coproduct of sodium carbonate and oil at those grades. The price of copper would have to rise to ten dollars a pound or some ridiculous figure like that to make it economic to mine a billion tons of copper from the medium grade deposits. The high grade deposits have already been mined where they were known.
And ten dollars a pound is still an economic price to pay for copper where it can't be substituted for by much cheaper aluminum or silica.

Lifeforms have a way of concentrating various elements within their bodies such as the way vertebrates concentrate calcium in their bones out of very low grade sources. Bioengineering could design microbes such as phytoplankton which can concentrate desired elements with in their bodies thereby greatly lowering the cost of extracting metals from low cost ores.

This is not true of all organisms and/or all elements
See Ecological Stoichiometry for a detailed account.

Ye gods.

I don't suppose you have an executive summary for those of us daunted by 300 pages of technical detail delivered via Google Books' mediocre interface ?

"Ecological stoichiometry" is a fancy way of saying "the conservation of mass in biological systems". The stuff making up living things comes from somewhere, and goes somewhere.

It's the study of what that stuff is (the elements), where it came from and where it goes (reactants and products in the environment), and how (organic chemistry).

I have not read the book, but SP's point is that the complex concentration of elements by biological systems doesn't always work the way thomas deplume suggests that it does.

And in working out such a complex problem, there will also be unintended, unforeseen consequences in its application.

Thanks.

I would add that your bio-concentrating process hasn't been thought thru.
Unless the elements you want to concentrate are already in solution, you still have the problem of collecting and concentrating the organisms (and collecting bacteria/phytoplankton from water isn't that easy either).
Given the high energy part is moving and crushing rocks... how is this process going to be better than leaching with acids/bases (also energy intensive)?

Any extant examples?

I wasn't saying completely how it would work but IF a bioengineered organism COULD be created that would do the job using solar energy. Perhaps a combination of microbes might be needed. The ability to slice and dice DNA opens up the POSSIBILITY of cheaper ways of processing materials. Small fast reproducing critters with shells which could concentrate metals and minerals out of a solution with pulverized low grade ore. The key words are if, could, and possibility.

Thanks for the great review of "Limits". I still have my 1974 copy of the original. It seems that lately I'm seeing increasing numbers of commentators making the same dumb statements about the "failed predictions" in the book. I get more outraged each time and, when possible, contact the author to offer correction. Only one (I forget who) actually acknowledged that he had never read the book.

Delayed forecast? Perhaps. Most certainly NOT "failed predictions!"

Here's why: Earth’s Collapsing Life Support Systems (ecosystems)

collapsing-ecosystems

From Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report (Pre-publication Final Draft Approved by MA Board on March 23, 2005)

Comments:

1. The”substantial production increase” in crops is achieved at the expense of a 5% annual increase in the application of chemical fertilizers.

2. The “substantial production increase” in aquaculture is achieved at the expense of permanent damage to capture fisheries.

3. The substantial production increase in livestock is achieved at the expense of degraded environment, increased use of antibiotics and hormones, use of chicken manure as feed and expanding feedlots industry. [Bon Appétit monsieur Stewart Brand!]

4. Regulating services: Air quality regulation: Global: “Increase" in "net source of carbon sequestration since mid-century”. The finding is hotly disputed.

Source: http://feww.wordpress.com/collapsing-ecosystems/

Legacy of Chernobyl:
http://feww.wordpress.com/2008/02/01/worlds-worst-polluted-places/

Thanks. Its amazing how misunderstood the book is - good luck with trying to get people to read (or understand) it...

As I have expressed to the authors of the three books, the problem with the series of scenarios is the inconsistent use of a baseline. The 'business-as-usual" scenario is presented as the baseline for the other scenarios to be compared against. Unfortunately, this is not done in any of the books. While the "business-as-usual" is touted as the baseline, it is immediately replaced with the double resources scenario, against which all other mitigation scenarios are compared. This is not the proper use of scenario construction/use to draw comparisons. The mitigation proposals should have used the "business-as-usual" baseline to draw conclusions;i.e. apply the mitigation steps to the "business-as-usual" run to see their impact. IMO, the reason this was not done was that applying the mitigation steps WITHOUT DOUBLE RESOURCES resulted in collapse for all scenarios.

Not one word so far about humankind's predilection for that most inefficient but inevitable of practices: warfare. All the foregoing assumptions about continuing to increase the efficiency of our industrial processes studiously ignore that facet of human nature which would choose "take" over "make" when times get tough.
Technological civilization gives each of us a power over our fellow citizens that would be unimaginable just a few centuries ago. But like scorpions trapped in a bottle, we're now forced to reign in the very instincts that have made Homo so devastatingly successful over all other large animals. Each of us could destroy others, but none can guarantee safety for himself. Our Cold War incarnation called this MAD - and it worked. That's social civilization, in my definition: A choice to forego the easy defections against our neighbors for the longer view, even if that means accepting a pie that's unevenly divided.
But what happens when the pie shrinks to the point that some here in the West are squeezed out altogether? What red-blooded American guy will choose "Grapes of Wrath" over "Rambo?" IMO it would only take 10% of the population abrogating the social contract to trigger anarchy.
I'm not optimistic that 90+% will choose pacifism with their poverty; That's why I view these models as best-case scenarios - Kum Ba Yahs 1 thru 9.

I agree - wasn't there an article about how people were investing more in security companies and other similar companies that profit off of warfare. Why because it may be more predictable that there will be big business in such things than green technology (which is admittedly fragile). But war with major powers will be far too weakening, too expensive.

So my bold prediction is thus: a re-colonization of already unstable regions with lots or resoures (like Africa and the Middle East).

When push comes to shove it'll be more politically expedient to carve up such regions (why conquer all of Iran when you can capture the oil producing south (relatively) easily and just bomb the rest of the county. Why even occupy it? Same in other countries where the oil/mineral resources are concentrated in specific locations.

The problem with any predictions is that you never know when some event happens that provides a window for people to exploit. I think the best tell tale sign is to look at less stable countries and see what happens. These problems will happen regionally before they happen globally - we may be seeing the start of that now (I think Nepal is a good example with my only evidence being that it's difficult to supply - with little political turmoil as sources of the disruption).

PNM is in the process of projecting electric energy demand, but maybe NOT fuel supply, for the next 20 years.

PNM updates 20 year projection each 3 years.

PNM is in the process of running Monte Carlo [a New Mexico thing] portfolio simulations.

So.

Let's look at the results of the simulations when they are given us.

PNM is in the process of projecting electric energy demand, but maybe NOT fuel supply, for the next 20 years.

PNM updates 20 year projection each 3 years.

PNM is in the process of running Monte Carlo [a New Mexico thing] portfolio simulations.

So.

Let's look at the results of the simulations when they are given us.

I am struck by how much a discontinuity in the financial situation might distort what would be normal patterns. Theoretically, people can continue to produce even if the financial system is a mess, but I doubt this would happen in practice. Models aren't set up to considers the financial system so will miss this effect.

Right, Gail.

Much of the discussion on TOD is based on world devoid of war, social revolutions and riots, disintegration of nation states (a relative new invention), famine, hyper-inflation and financial collapse.

I suspect Peak Oil will have a profound effect on credit markets. Many of these projects require massive amounts of capital that may not be available without confiscation by the government. Who wants a 20yr infrastructure bond in the age of Peak Oil?

We may have already hit "Peak Credit" in the U.S.

All the knowledge at peak oil is great BUT!

It is pretty clear right now that the biosphere is seriously damaged. {collapse of west antartic ice sheet a few years ago,and this northern summerś extreme and unexpected loss of ice in the arctic circle are real bad tipping points.

This has been caused by the use of fossil fuels. Common sense - stop using fossil fuels. This will conserve the oil for future use and allow the biosphere a bit of brething space to recover itś composure.

How do we stop using fossil fuel. Everyone just has to stop consuming eveything thst is not essential to basic survival.

Life on this planet is trying to do just that, the US financial system is trying to collapse and is prevented from doing so by a crazy federal bank shoring it up with megabucks. The best thing that could happen would be for the global economy to collapse, and no later than next week.

We need to get this simple message across to those people without äcademic skills to read deeply.

THE PLANET IS VERY SICK, WE HAVE CAUSED IT BY BURNING FOSSIL FUELS. STOP BURNING FOSSIL FUEL.

I am now going to search my house for power outlets, and remove the plugs.
I am going to shut down my ¨Always On Linux Firewall/Server¨
I am not going to make payments on my credit cards till a magistrate orders me to do so.
I am going to take all my money out of the bank and store it in a tin buried in the garden.
I am going to stay at home and not use my car, I will go get groceries on my pushbike.
I am going to reduce my food consumption by 50%. I am going to cut satisfaction spending to zero.
I turned off the telvision years ago.

In short, I AM TAKING BACK MY LIFE, the life that was taken from me by the brainwashing, thought numbing media juggernaut.

If anyone wants to help, feel free to imbibe.

¨Letś do it for Al Gore¨, anyone that optimistic deserves a helping hand.

Sounds like an overreaction or black/white; on/off thinking to me.
I doubt you'll be successful, especially at reducing food consumption by 50%. Been there, tried that, doesn't work.

I first read the "Limits to Growth" around about 1975 when I was a bus driver in Minneapolis. It was one of the most influential books I ever read. Together with the crazy inflation at the time it convinced me I eventually had to get out of the city and go back to the farm. I bought some land in 1977 and it has been a struggle to pay for it. I didn't know about peak oil until about 2004. Thinking back I believe it may be that book that made Peak Oil such an easy sell in my mind. Nowadays with runaway oil and commodity prices again the book seems more prescient than ever. I'm glad I left the city and recommend others to think about it too even at this late date.

The late Dana Meadows (lead author of limits to growth) was a friend of mine. We talked many times about the reactions and criticsm of LTG. She said her attic was full of comments of people who refused to suspend belief in their own world view to examine other possibilities.

I have been working with system dynamics computer models with students for 20 years now; working with the late Barry Richmond (who created the STELLA systems modeling software) and Peter Senge at MIT. I have been experiencing the frustration Big Gav expresses for some time now.

One of the problems with systems thinking, in general, is that people are generally pretty good at defining the components of a dynamic system, but bad at deducing the feedback relationships and absolutely horrible at predicting the behavior of a complex system.

Even when you allow people to put in their own assumptions about critical components (as I watched Barry do with Fortune 500 CEOs and CFOs) and the model shows an overshoot and collapse regardless of the change in variables, people refuse to acknowledge the possibility of a real overshoot and collapse because it does not fit their mental models of the world.

Many of us are working at the K12 level to try to develop a capacity of the next generation to understand feedback, dynamic behavior and systems thinking in general. The Creative Learning Exchange (http://www.clexchange.org/) has some more information on this effort. In a complex world with less resilience and tighter coupling, this is essential.

I was at a system dynamics conference in Bergen in 2000, listened to Jorgen Randers (coauthor of LTG) and spoke to him afterwards. I haven't seen him since, but he saw no reason at that time to doubt that the main points of LTG were right on track.

* Lastly, scenario 9 (the one everyone seems to forget) assumes pollution control technology, increasing efficiency of resource utilisation, increased agricultural yields, stable population (growth easing down to replacement rate) and stable industrial output per capita. This scenario (shown above) ends with all indicators stable and above present levels at the end of the century.

Even when you allow people to put in their own assumptions about critical components...and the model shows an overshoot and collapse regardless of the change in variables, people refuse to acknowledge the possibility of a real overshoot and collapse because it does not fit their mental models of the world.

And what of the mental models of people who refuse to acknowledge that not all parameter settings result in overshoot and collapse?

By and large, peak oil and related issues are not technological problems - known technology is capable of solving the near-term difficulties we face - but rather social and particularly organizational problems. That a technology exists doesn't mean we'll deploy it in time.

(And that, incidentally, is why perma-doomers are just as dangerous as perma-optimists - "the problem can't be solved" is just as passive and self-defeating as "there is no problem", and just as much the enemy of anyone who wants to fix that problem.)

And that, incidentally, is why perma-doomers are just as dangerous as perma-optimists - "the problem can't be solved" is just as passive and self-defeating as "there is no problem", and just as much the enemy of anyone who wants to fix that problem.

This needs to be underlined and put in a frame. What I find even more dangerous are the "rational" perma-doomers/optimists. Those that do not even realise they have predetermined the outcomes when coming up with the assumptions of their long-term scenarios. Therefore such scenario making could be a very destructive thing, on balance - especially if near term policies are implemented on the basis of long term assumptions.

Personally I am an agnostic for the extremely long term. I would rather focus on problem solving on the observable medium term - the only responsible approach IMO.

Pitt,

(And that, incidentally, is why perma-doomers are just as dangerous as perma-optimists - "the problem can't be solved" is just as passive and self-defeating as "there is no problem", and just as much the enemy of anyone who wants to fix that problem.)

I really have to question whether you know any "perma-doomers" personally because it certainly does not represent my experience - as a "doomer" I have lots of contact with other "doomers."

First, I think you'd find that most doomers follow the adage, "Hope for the best but prepare for the worst." In other words, they hedge their bet that society will actually do anything a priori to mitigate potential problems.

Second, you will find that many (and all that I know) are actively sharing information. This includes not only basic stuff like how to can tomatoes but also what actions society as a whole might take. This is hardly passive.

Third, they are "actively" taking personal action which is more than can be said of the remainder of society.

Finally, why don't you spell out the details of YOUR plan to save the world? I am not trying to be snarky here but rather would like to see what specific actions you believe are necessary.

Todd

"the problem can't be solved" is just as passive and self-defeating as "there is no problem", and just as much the enemy of anyone who wants to fix that problem.

I think you'd find that most doomers follow the adage, "Hope for the best but prepare for the worst."

And those people are pretty obviously not the ones I'm talking about.

I really have to question whether you know any "perma-doomers" personally

Actually, I no longer personally know any doomers at all, at least that I know of. I did know one, but in the course of a lengthy discussion of the topic, it turned out that the influences on his thinking had made several assumptions that were either unfounded or contradicted available evidence. Once he realized that, he re-evaluated his views in light of this new evidence, and is no longer a doomer.

Most of the folks I know have a pretty scientific mindset, and so are not at all adverse to changing their minds.

(I'd be quite willing to change my own, but - frankly - I have yet to find a doomer argument that holds together under close scrutiny. If I can punch holes in a paper I'm reviewing, it fails to get published; if I can punch holes in an argument I'm reading, it fails to persuade. It's the mindset I've developed from working in science, and it's a good acid test for whether something is worth taking seriously.)

why don't you spell out the details of YOUR plan to save the world?

It only needs to be "saved" if you assume that it's in terrible danger.

Based on the data I've seen, there is not an immediate and impending crisis; accordingly, there is no need for me to "save the world", and rushing around trying to do so would be an inefficient use of resources, particularly time. As I see things, there's a significant change that needs to be undertaken, and the best way to do so - both in terms of efficiency of using society's resources, in terms of likelihood of getting it done, and in terms of maximizing social welfare - is to incrementally make that change as circumstances and technology permit. It would be wasteful to embark on a crash program of building solar PV in 2008, for example, vs. investing in research and progressively building up solar capacity via the much cheaper, more efficient, and more effective solar cells that will come out of that research.

So "what is your plan to save the world" is only a sensible question for people who share your mindset of imminent catastrophe. I don't, so it isn't.

I have yet to find a doomer argument that holds together under close scrutiny.

I'd second that.

There clearly isn't a shortage of available energy - the amount available from renewables is much more than 10,000 times the amount we currently obtain from fossil fuels.

The "best" doomer arguments either talk about all the limits to growth being hit (soil depletion / land erosion, chemical buildup in the ecosystem etc) rather than just peak oil or global warming. Some flap their hands and talk about human psychology (or the dominant forms of politics) being the real problem.

I've yet to see a half way convincing argument that we can't replace oil with alternatives - and ones that we would be better off for using.

Todd already asked you a few pointed questions. I'd like to see your answers as well, Pitt. What are you doing to help in this matter?

And this...

By and large, peak oil and related issues are not technological problems - known technology is capable of solving the near-term difficulties we face - but rather social and particularly organizational problems. That a technology exists doesn't mean we'll deploy it in time.

Geez, steal a line from me from 2005, will ya? ;) Does this make you a "doomer"? Me? If not you but me, then why?

I don't hold to the "this problem cannot be solved" line of thinking at all. But I do hold to the "we aren't doing squat to solve these problems yet and thus may have to face the consequences" line of thinking. There's a wee bit of difference. Of course that difference detracts from the straw man you just erected to knock down...

I don't hold to the "this problem cannot be solved" line of thinking at all.

Then, rather obviously, I wasn't talking about you. Simple, no?

But I do hold to the "we aren't doing squat to solve these problems yet

That's not correct. Things are being done - for example, wind turbine buildouts, electric car research, solar PV research, etc.

A reasonable position would be "we're moving too slowly to solve these problems in time"; to say we're doing nothing is simply in error.

I don't hold....I do hold....There's a wee bit of difference. Of course that difference detracts from the straw man you just erected to knock down.

It's not a straw man; the poster I replied to stated that all models showed overshoot and collapse, which was explicitly refuted by the article he was replying to (which I pointed out). I then took the opportunity to address the related mindset (which has been demonstrated on TOD, although thankfully not hugely frequently) of believing that overshoot and collapse is inevitable in real life.

What you do or do not believe is irrelevant to my post, as I was not talking about what you personally believe.

Not everything is about you, you know.

***

Why is there a cluster of people responding to me saying that I'm not talking about their own personal beliefs? Are people so self-absorbed that they think everything posted on the internet is directed at them personally?

(And that, incidentally, is why perma-doomers are just as dangerous as perma-optimists - "the problem can't be solved" is just as passive and self-defeating as "there is no problem", and just as much the enemy of anyone who wants to fix that problem.)

I'll second what Todd says, having gone through similar changes myself. This smacks just too much of 'blaming the messenger' to me; something I've encountered many times before and IMO reflects a reaction to possibly being wrong about things and seeking a scapegoat (blame the 'doomers' which have been defined in a conveniently stereotyped strawman fashion).

It also strikes me that the most influential people, on this list anyway, are working constructively for the future of humanity, even as they may disagree with each other on the methods.

http://worldchanging.com/archives/004246.html

Imagine a database of thousands of items all related to understanding how the future could turn out. This database would include narrow concerns and large-scale driving forces alike, would have links to relevant external materials, and would have space for the discussion of and elaboration on the entries. The items in the database would link to scenario documents showing how various forces and changes could combine to produce different possible outcomes. Best of all, the entire construction would be open access, free for the use.

As a result, people around the world could start playing with these scenario elements, re-mixing them in new ways, looking for heretofore unseen connections and surprising combinatorial results. Sharp eyes could seek out and correct underlying problems of logic or fact. Organizations with limited resources and few connections to big thinkers would be able to craft scenario narratives of their own with a planet's worth of ideas at their fingertips.

This is what a world of open source scenario planning might look like.

Sounds like a wet dream for us at TOD. Lots of Stuart Stanifords in every technical area(agriculture, oil energy technologies, economics, politics) contributing to future scenarios for our future and whittling it down to the best possible scenario for all concerned resulting in the end in peace, love and happiness with full bellies, conservation, unlimited energy supplies,etc.- We just have to figure it out in a rational manner on an open source planning wiki. Hmm, well maybe.

I tend to think of a quote from a Peter Gabriel song "Perspective"

http://www.mp3lyrics.org/p/peter-gabriel/perspective/

I need perspective, 'cos I'm facing the wall.
I need perspective, 'cos I'm not that tall.
I need perspective, heard the trumpet call.
Don't trust my eyes, want to know where things fall.

Following above blog post was very pertinent comment made about scenario planning:

http://worldchanging.com/archives/004246.html

Good idea, except the problem with scenarios is that they often border on banality (e.g. Shell's scenarios are famous for their emptyness).
Scenarios are mostly the reflection of scenario-writers' highly subjective and highly culturally determined perceptions of the present, projected onto the future, with obvious anachronistic flaws. They suffer under the same interminable methodological quarrels as all the humanistic sciences do (we've all heard of the Methodenstreit in sociology, psychology, history, economy, etc...). The important thing to ask is: who is writing the future? Who's doing the scenario?

I honestly don't see how any open source strategy or the sharing of tools and methods by a large number of people would improve on this 'epistemic' problem - systematically. It would merely broaden the number of choices and perspectives one can take to write scenario's. It would make them more explicit and probably more diffuse. And it would make the writers more acutely aware of their own subjectivity as writers. Which is a good thing. (But hardly new; our ethnography professor always used to say that self-confession amongst alfa-scientists is the best epistemological strategy around, and the oldest one. "Always start your thesis with: "I'm a marxist historian, I will not write anything in an objective manner, please find the sources I refuse to use, in annex II", ect...).

To overcome this problem ('who writes the future'), I think an experiment would consist of launching a specific topic, with some voting system which will determine which elements become "drivers" and main categories for the scenario; and then do a meta-study to see who has contributed which elements, and made which decisions. You'd have to carry out a survey asking all participants for their political, cultural and academic background, etc...

That could be part of the idea: a continuous "feedback", showing who stresses which kind of methodology or element of it.

In any case, what scenarios need most is self-relativism and some kind of 'meta'-perspective. If the open source idea offers a methodology for this aspect of the scenario-writing business, it would vastly improve the trade.

This also reminds me of the differences that quickly surfaced when Stuart strayed from pure data analysis of facts on the ground in Saudi fields. Many said he was biased towards his own viewpoint and that the whole exercise was therefore worthless. He openly said the same about Kunstler's and others views for example in his piece The fallacy of reversibility-Why Peak Oil Actually Helps Industrial Agriculture - http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3481.

Jeff Vail hit on the whole problem here:
More thoughts on Relocalization
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3554

What are our goals—is it merely to meet our minimal nutritional requirements, or to amass the most material possessions? Who benefits from centralized processes vs. decentralized, and what political structures to they tend to support and accrete? Are we seeking to maximize the mean or median fulfillment of human ontogeny? These are ultimately moral and philosophical questions, and ones that I will not attempt to answer here.

I find it important that we consider what we do with the future, if we intend to have one of course.

I suspect that some sort of default will run its course as the current trajectory has to run out of steam before alternatives are attempted in the sense of the famous quote thats says one does everything else first and then only as a last resort "the right thing". This right thing is of course what ultimately works. It sounds a bit like experimental hit and miss, Edison with the light bulb, not Tesla's true genius, inventing alternating current.

I admit I speculate as much as anyone on what "We" should do or where the world is going to, if X then Y, in politics, in economics, GW, PO, etc.

Maybe a sum of the subjective assumptions of all humanity weighed according to their particular influence on the outcome at any point in time plus the same for the nonhuman reality (animal, vegetable, mineral, etc) could give us a sense of where we are going. The human reality we attempt to figure out moment by moment in market behaviour (DJI up/down) and through elections/politics but stabilizing the feedback amongst all the people and the natural world to maintain a stable system without collapse (managing earth) is a hard task indeed.

Gav,

I have never come across a rational discussion of what the book actually describes

Does this Simmons piece have the nous you are looking for?

Revisiting The Limits to Growth: Could The Club of Rome Have Been Correct, After All?

If it doesn't what would you see as its weaknesses?

During the 90's I assisted a neighbor, the late L. F. Buz Ivanhoe as he did not use computers and was unfamiliar with the internet. Buz (aka Bus and Buzz) had once worked with Hubbert. Buz told me that Hubbert had made no 'predictions' about the date of peak oil except for the lower 48. He was an honest scientist and knew that he did not know how much oil would be discovered in Alaska or in other relatively unexplored areas. Buz said that Hubbert was pressured by publishers to make statements about world peak oil. To do so he would take estimates of others about total endowments, 2 trillion bbl for example. He would then draw sample curves which he intended to be projections or scenarios, not predictions.
Professional demographers do not normally 'predict' world population in 2050. They do not know what the birth and death rates will be in 2049. They develop multiple sample projections using various assumptions about birth and death rates. In my opinion Hubbert was making similar projections.
http://hubbert.mines.edu

A note published about this issue on energyresources a few years back.
-----------------------------------------------------

This is a follow up to post 20439 about a Donella Meadows column. Of
all the items I have seen over the years on Thomas Jefferson and
Sally Hemming, Donella's Nov 12,1998 column is my favorite. Yes it
also deals with energy. See:
http://iisd1.iisd.ca/pcdf/meadows/jefferson.html For a tribute to
Donella see: http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0228-04.htm This
tribute also discusses the Report to the Club of Rome. One commonly
sees misinformation about the Club of Rome. I have seen this on
energyresources, on trash talk at junkscience and elsewhere. Bjorn
Lomborg was an egregious offender. I never know whether such writers
are ignorant, knowingly dishonest, or just sloppy. Those writing
about the Club of Rome should first re-read the report, carefully.

Edit to add 1999 response from Donella Meadows
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0GER/is_1999_Spring/ai_54321451

... Hubbert had made no 'predictions' ...

The same can be said for E. F Schumacher. In Small is Beautiful he referred to "exploratory calculations." He was pretty clear about predicting the future, as in it wasn’t really possible. He did seem to feel it was important to investigate possible outcomes, hence his “exploration” concept. No predictions, just what would it look like, based on what we know now, if we do this, that, or the other.

I meant a debate (such as we are having here - which isn't a bad one) - not an article on the topic - sorry for the confusion.

I link to Simmons' article in my post. I thought it was a good piece of work.

If it doesn't what would you see as its weaknesses?

From a quick scan:

  1. His numbers don't add up.

    In 1970, the world population totaled 3.4 billion. Of this, 1.2 billion were living in "more developed" countries while 2.2 billion resided in "less-developed" countries. The rich/poor split was 35/65....Europe's "Big Four" (England, Germany, France, and Italy) had 161 million people.
    ...
    Three decades later, the world's total population approximates 6.4 billion....The population growth of Europe's Big Four was one of the slowest in the world. Yet, even these countries grew by 61% to 260 million.
    ...
    In three decades, the rich/poor gap has widened from 35/65 to 20/80!

    20% of 6.4B = 1.28B. So he's saying there are about 1.3B people living in the developed world in 2000, which is just 100M more than in 1970.

    Europe's "Big Four" alone added that full 100M, with another 80M in the US.

    His 20/80 split requires that tens or hundreds of millions of people dropped out of the developed world between 1970 and 2000, which simply isn't the case. The only explanation I can think of is that he was considering the USSR "developed" and the former-USSR "developing", but that would not be an honest change in definitions to leave unsaid and unexplained, and would probably not be a reasonable change to make at all. It would also contradict his next alarmist statement, that "all the poor populations of the globe are expanding fast", as most of the former USSR is shrinking in population.

  2. He makes claims with no data.

    Since the quality and accuracy of the data for the fastest growing regions of the world could easily be off by 10 to 15%, with any error likely to be understating the real total, we might be a lot closer to 7 billion then anyone knows.

    Based on what does he assert that professional demographers are so inept they'd miss half a billion people? Does he think he's the only one able to make estimates? Why does he assert that errors will systematically be undercounts?

  3. His interpretations go against the data.

    The report demonstrated that the process of economic growth, as it is occurring today, is inexorably widening the absolute gap between the rich and the poor nations of the world.
    ...
    As detailed in the following Exhibits IV, several countries' actual per capita GNP were, in fact, ahead of the extrapolations detailed in The Limits to Growth. On balance, the ten countries came close to meeting a projection which the authors of The Limits to Growth did not think could really happen in just 30 years.

    What the table actually shows is that the GDP growth of developed nations was overestimated, while the GDP growth of developing nations was underestimated. The book expected developed nations to have a per-country average of 1.4% of the per capita GDP of developed nations, whereas his figures from 1999 show that they actually had 3.3%, or 2-3 times the ratio expected. That simple observation strongly undermines his argument of inexorably widening inequality.

    (To be fair, inequality did indeed increase - the developing-country ratio fell from 5.0% - but that was exclusively due to increasing equality within the rich world as Japan and Germany closed the gap with the US. Compared to the US alone, the developing-country average was 3.0% of the US's per-capita GDP in 1968 and 3.1% in 1999, representing a small decrease in inequality as measured against the top economy.)

  4. He makes assumptions which we already know to be wrong.

    The arithmetic is easy to do. Over the past 30 years, China's population has grown from 850 million people to 1.25 billion. Extrapolate this growth to 2030 and there will be almost 2 billion people.

    No serious demographer believes China will ever reach 2 billion people, and the odds are zero of it happening by 2030. Indeed, estimates are for China's population to peak around that time at a little under 1.5B before beginning the long, slow decline seen in the developed world.

Gav: "Both of these views are completely false, yet I have never come across a rational discussion of what the book actually describes"

I think Jamais misses another, even more important point:

Most of the people discussing, dissing and representing the book have never actually read it themselves cover to cover.

Some have browsed it, some have read a review, some read an interview with one of the authors, most just happened to use a ReadyMade opinion available from the media ("Doom!Gloom!", "Green Mad Men!" etc).

That's really sad, but most people just don't read books.

Especially difficult ones that require independent thinking.

Jamais just answered the question I asked, which assumed people had read the book.

Unfortunately you are right - a lot of people haven't read the book (or bothered to understand what they read) and have simply believed some of the yths they have read about it.

Some 32 years ago, H. E. Goeller delivered a lecture which he had co-authored with Alvin Weinberg, at Eindhotten in the Netherlands. The lectures title was "Age of Substitutability." Weinberg later explained that the purpose of the "Age of Substitutability" was to demonstrate the absurdity of the Club of Rome study. The "Age of Substitutability" dan be downloaded from the internet.
http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/servlets/purl/5045860-HVRCd7/5045860...

Goeller and Weinberg argued that by using breeder reactors enough energy could be extracted from known supplies of uranium and thorium to support a high energy world wide economy for thousands of years. They further argued that through substitution of common minerals for rare minerals, human material needs could be meet.

In theory, Goeller and Weinberg were correct
---------------------------------------Weinberg was born in Chicago to Russian emigrants and educated at the University of Chicago. He co-authored the standard text on nuclear chain reaction theory with Nobel Laureate Eugene Wigner in the 1940s. He wrote for Physics Today magazine "Energy as an Ultimate Raw Material" (November 1959, page 18)

Weinberg also played a major role in alerting Congress and the scientific community to the danger to global climate posed by CO2 emissions. During the last years of Weinberg;s administration at ORNL became the nations leading center of CO2 research, and he continued his personal research on the effects of burning fossil fuels on global climate on the worlds economy. Goeller was also involved in research on on CO2 and climate change during the 1970's.

Yes, let's grasp at the least probable of all the straws that depends on massive infrastructure changes in our civilization and further, upon massive behavioral changes by the majority of homo sapiens. Then let's assume that this is already ongoing and we haven't already blown nearly 40 years of lead time to make the change. Then we can talk this hypothetical non-occurring set of changes to death as a "solution" while remaining on the same course we have always held. Meanwhile we can ignore any scenario that remotely bears any resemblance to what is actually occurring and which ends in disaster for our species. After doing that we can then raise silly questions of why "doomers" (such conveniently pejorative labeling) ignore the single (slightly) optimistic scenario.

Self-deception - the most essential ingredient of homo sapiens...

Nate Hagens!! Are you paying attention here?

I certainly grasped at the nuclear straw during the 60's. I no longer do so. Although Weinberg became famous as a nuclear expert and for such quotations as Faustian Bargain and his subtitle Burning the Rocks and Burning the Seas (fission and fusion), his original training was largely in biology. In the 1959 article he devoted the first page or two to Harrison Brown and other authors who suggested that our conventional energy resources would eventually be limited. The rest of the article was a highly technical explanation of the nuclear technology of the 50's.

So, should we all just lie down and put paper bags over our heads?

There are a host of choices between pretending all is well and choosing to "lie down and put paper bags over our heads".

The fact that you ask this straw-man, two-dimensional question is proof that you didn't even wish to discuss the issue.

Who was pretending all is well ?

Maybe you should ask who made the first strawman argument.

But perhaps you don't really want to discuss the issue either - its easier to ignore the whole point of the post.

Massive infrastructure changes? You mean, sort of like those which have occurred over the last century in the U.S.?

Massive behavioral changes? Once again, like those we've seen over the past century?

You blithely dismiss the fact that we can change, by ignoring all of the changes we as a society have already made.

I highly doubt the optimistic scenario is valid, because I expect we'll see a lot more difficulties before finally adopting the necessary course of action, but the belief that "human nature" is going to force us to march directly off the cliff is equally absurd.

I remember hearing about Limits to Growth and the Club of Rome when the book first came out. It was something of a raging controversy in the popular press, but had very little credibility among academic scientist and economist at the time. My memory is not clear so don't take my word for it, but there is a reasonably brief history under 'Limits to Growth' in Wikipedia. (You think Wikipedia is not a proper reference? Well I think it is at least on a par with the original work of Limits to Growth.) I remember liking it but cautiously. I was at the time a young academic physicist hoping for tenure. It didn't seem to handle the dependence of reserve estimates on the current price at all. And I liked that because I was suspicious of economics. But read Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limits_to_Growth
On reading wikipedia, I get the impression that they scaled up their reserve data by 5x in order to account for reserve growth because of price rise - very crude! But maybe good enough for a press release.

FWIW, I still have my 1972 copy of LTG on my bookshelf. Guess I was ahead of my time.

For the past two weeks our local tv weather man has been predicting thunderstorms and showers.
Itś been fine and sunny every day. Mr weather man gave up yesterday predicting fine weather ahead.

Today itś raining in bucketś.

The artic ice melt in summer was not supposed to happen for another 50 years. It went veryt close to doing just that last year
..........etc etc etc

So much for mathematical modelling.

The copy of Limits to Growth I have is from 2004. Since then the science on global warming has found many more positive feed back loops. On page 118 it says:

On a warmer Earth the ocean will expand and sea levels will rise. If the warming is sufficient to melt polar ice in large quantities, sea levels will rise significantly, but on longer time horizons.

That has to be seen as too conservative. We may even have abrupt climate change as the Arctic summer sea ice disappears in the next years.

Causes of Changes in Arctic Sea Ice; by Wieslaw Maslowski (Naval Postgraduate School)
http://www.ametsoc.org/atmospolicy/documents/May032006_Dr.WieslawMaslows...

To take up earlier remarks: yes, the chance of discontinuities is underestimated.

On of the most limiting factors are now:
(A) DENIAL mode
(B) tendency towards BAU
(C) eternal growth mentality

What the book has not covered is what I call "the deadly embrace between peak oil and global warming", that is all our efforts to reduce CO2 emissions (=large scale wind, solar, renewable energy projects and rail electrification) will get stuck in diesel shortages.